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Abstract
This paper proposes a secure anonymity scalable and practical payment protocol for the
Internet purchases It uses electronic cash for payment transactions In this new protocol users
can improve the anonymity for themselves if they worry about disclosure of their identities We
delegate an agent to provide the higher anonymous certicate and improve the security The
agent will certify reencrypted data after verifying the validity of the content from users but
without any private information of the users With this new method each user can get the
required anonymity level depending on the available time computation and the cost Further
more the new payment protocol can prevent from eavesdropping tampering and impersonation
eectively
We also analyse how to prevent a user from spending a coin more than once and discuss
how to use the proposed protocol for the Internet purchases The new method provides an
ecient and untraceable electronic cash scheme It is promising for electronic trades through
the Internet
Keywords  Electroniccash Anonymity Traceability Hash function
  Introduction
Recent advances in the Internet and WWW have enabled rapid development in ECommerce More
and more business begin to develop or adopt Ecommerce systems to support their selling activities
While this brings convenience for both consumers and vendors many users have concerns about
the security and their private information when purchasing over the Internet Especially with the
electronic payment or Ecase payment Users often prefer to have some degrees of anonymity when
doing shopping over the Internet There are a number of proposals for electronic cash systems All
of them lack of exibility in anonymity David Chaum  	rst proposed an online payment system
that will guarantee receiving valid coins This system provides anonymity against a collaboration
of shops and the bank Another online CyberCoin 
http wwwcybercashcom approach allows
clients making payments by signing fund transfer requests to merchants The merchants submit
the signed requests to the bank for authorization of the payments The protocol is not fully
anonymous since it allows the issuing bank to track every purchase Furthermore the scalability
of the CyberCoin protocol is questionable since it relies on the availability of a single online bank
NetBill  extends the above payment mechanism by supporting goods atomicity and
certi	ed delivery The drawbacks of its protocol are the addition of extra messages and the
signi	cant increase in the amount of encryption used However DigiCash  uses blind signatures
to provide a fully anonymous coinbased payment system This system has the disadvantages of
centralized management of issuing and checking double spending of coins
The most sophisticated protocol is the SET protocol  which was designed to facilitate
credit card transactions over the Internet SET security comes at a considerable computation and
communication cost SET unlike other simpler online protocols does not oer full anonymity
nonrepudiation or certi	ed delivery
The above systems are online payment systems They need sophisticated cryptographic func
tions for each coin and require additional computational resources for the bank to validate the
purchases Forcing the bank to be online at payment is a very strict requirement Online pay
ment systems secure the merchant and the bank against customer fraud since every payment needs
to be approved by the customers bank The primary disadvantage of online authorization is the
cost associated with per transaction imposed by requirements for a highly reliable and ecient
clearing system at the customers bank
In an oline protocol the merchant veri	es the payment using cryptographic techniques and
commits the payment to the payment authority later in an oline batch process Oline payment
systems were designed to lower the cost of transactions due to the delaying to verify the batch
processes Oline payment systems however suer from the potential of double spending whereby
the electronic currency might be duplicated and spent repeatedly
The 	rst oline anonymous electronic cash was introduced by Chaum Fiat and Naor 
The security of their scheme relied on some restrict assumptions There is also no formal proof
was attempted Although hardly practical their system demonstrated how oline ecash can be
constructed and laid the foundation for more secure and ecient schemes
 Chan Frankel and Tsiounis  presented a provable secure oline ecash scheme that
relied only on the security of RSA  This scheme extended the work of Franklin and Yung
 who aimed to achieve provable security without the use of general computation protocols
The anonymity of users is based on the security of RSA and cannot be changed after the system
established NetCents  proposed a lightweight exible and secure protocol for micropayments
electronic commerce over the Internet This protocol is designed only to support purchases ranging
in value from a fraction of a penny and up In  David Pointcheval  presented a payment
scheme in which the users identity can be found any time by the certi	cation authority So the
privacy of a user cannot be protected
As mentioned above the online ecash payments need much more computing resources The
most proposed oline schemes are only for micropayments They just rely on the heuristic proofs
of security and therefore do not formally prevent fraud and counterfeit money Furthermore most
online and oline payment schemes do not provide ecient anonymity for users Hence a new
payment scheme for the purchases over the Internet with both untraceable and exible anonymity

will be very useful and very important
In this paper we 	rst analyse epayment models then propose a new oline electronic cash
scheme in which the anonymity of users is scalable and that can be done by user themself Users
can get the required anonymity without showing their identities to any other third part This is a
true anonymous for the legal users and it can trace users identities for double spending
The paper is organized as follows In the following section some basic de	nitions and the simple
examples are reviewed The payment model and the anonymity provider agent are described in
section  The design of a new oline electronic cash scheme and its complexity are detailed in
section  and the security analysis of our scheme is given in section  How to use the new ecash
for the Internet purchases is given in section  Conclusions are included in section 
 Some Basic Denitions
  Hash functions
h
x is a hash function For a given value x it is computationally hard to 	nd a y   x such that
h
x  h
y ie collisions are hard to 	nd
Hash function is a major building block for several cryptographic protocols including pseudo
random generators   digital signatures  and message authentication
   DLA and ElGamal encryption system
Discrete Logarithm Assumption 
 DLA  is an assumption that the discrete logarithm problem is
believed to be dicult and also to be the hard direction of a oneway function
The discrete logarithm problem is as follows  given an element g in a group G of order t and
another element y of G 	nd a x where   x  t   such that y is the result of composing g
with itself x times In some groups there exist elements that can generate all the elements of G by
exponentiation 
ie applying the group operation repeatedly with all the integers from  to t 
When this occurs the element is called a generator and the group is called cyclic Rivest  has
analyzed the expected time to solve the discrete logarithm problem both in terms of computing
power and cost
For this reason it has been used for the basis of several publickey cryptosystems including
the famous ElGamal encryption system ElGamal encryption system  is a public key encryption
scheme which meets the semantic security Let us briey recall it
step  The system needs a group   of order q and a generator g
The secret key is an element X  Z
q
and the public key is Y 	 g
X

step 
 For any message m    c 	 Ym r 	 g
r
 Y
r
m for a random r  Z
q
 fg
step  For any ciphertext c 	 a bm 	 DX c 	 ba
X

ElGamal encryption scheme

  Undeniable signature scheme and Schnorr signature scheme
Undeniable signature scheme devised by Chaum and van Antwerpen  is nonself authenticating
signature schemes where signatures can only be veri	ed with the signers consent However if a
signature is only veri	able with the aid of a signer a dishonest signer may refuse to authenticate
a genuine document Undeniable signatures solve this problem by adding a new component called
the disavowal protocol in addition to the normal components of signature and veri	cation
An undeniable proof scheme consists of the following algorithms 
 The key generation algorithm K which outputs random pairs of secret and public keys

sk pk
 The proof algorithm P 
skm which on input a fact m returns an undeniable signature
s on m
However this proof s does not convince anybody by itself To get convinced of the validity of
the pair 
m s relatively to the public key pk one has to interact with the owner of the secret key
sk
 The con	rmation process con	rmation 
sk pkm s which is an interactive protocol between
the signer and the veri	erwhere the prover
the signer tries to convince the validity of the pair

m s
 The disavowal process disavowal 
sk pkm s which is an interactive protocol between the
signer and the veri	erwhere the prover 
the singer tries to convince that the pair 
m s is not
valid 
ie has not been produced by him
Schnorr proposed a undeniable signature scheme in   We simply recall it
The system needs primes p and q such that qjp  g  Z
p
with order q ie g
q
	 modp g 	 
A user generates by himself a private key s which is a random number in Z
q

The corresponding public key v is the number v 	 g
 s
modp
To sign message m with the private key s perform the following steps
 Compute x 	 g
r
modp where r  Z
q
is a random number

 Compute e 	 hxm where h is a hash function
 Compute y 	 r  semodq and output the signature e y
To verify the signature e y for message m with public key v compute x 	 g
y
v
e
modp and
check that e 	 hxm
Schnorr signature scheme
 Basic model and new payment model
We will discuss the basic payment model and our new payment model in this section
 Basic payment model
Electronic cash has sparked wide interest among cryptographers 
     etc In its
simplest form an ecash system consists of three parts 
a bank B a user U and a shop S and three

main procedures as shown in Figure  
withdrawal payment and deposit In a coins lifecycle
the user U 	rst performs an account establishment protocol to open an account with the bank B
BANK
USER SHOP
Withdrawal 
Payment
Deposit
Figure   Basic electronic cash system
The users and the shops maintain an account with the bank while
 U withdraws electronic coins from his account by performing a withdrawal protocol with the
bank B over an authenticated channel
 U spends a coin by participating in a payment protocol with a shop S over an anonymous
channel and
 S performs a deposit protocol with the bank B to deposit the users coin into his account
The system is oline if the shop S does not communicate with the bank B during payment
It is untraceable if there is no ppt TM 
probabilistic polynomialtime Turing Machine that can
identify a coins origin even if it accesses to all withdrawal payment and deposit transactions
It is anonymous if the bank B in collaboration with the shop S cannot trace the coin to the
user However in the absence of tamperproof hardware electronic coins can be copied and spent
multiple times by the user U  This has been traditionally referred to as doublespending In online
ecash doublespending is prevented by having the bank check if the coin has been deposited before
In oline ecash however this solution is not possible instead as proposed by Chaum Fiat and
Naor  the system guarantees that if a coin is doublespent the users identity is revealed with
overwhelming probability
There are also three additional processes such as the bank setup the shop setup and the user
setup 
account opening They describe the system initialization namely creation and posting of
public keys and opening of bank accounts Although they are certainly parts of a complete system
these are often omitted as their functionalities can be easily inferred from the description of the
three main procedures For clarity we will only describe the bank setup and the user setup 
because
the shop setup is as similar as the user setup for our new scheme in the next section
Besides the basic participants a third part named Anonymity Provider 
AP agent will be
involved in our scheme AP agent will help the user to get required anonymity and it will not be
involved in a purchase process The new model can be shown in Figure  The AP agent gives a
certi	cate to the user when she needs a higher level anonymity

User Bank
ShopAP agent
withdrawal
depositpayment
anonymrity
scalable
Figure   New electronic cash model
  Anonymity Provider Agent
Here we explain what the AP agent will do
We assume that a user owns a valid coin c  
pk
B
 pk
u
 y with its certi	cate Cert
c
 which
guarantees correct withdrawal from the bank Whether a coin is valid or not is depending on its
certi	cate Therefore the bank can do revocation if found a user who spends a coin twice After
the following processes with the AP agent the user owns a new valid coin c
 
 
pk
B
 pk
u
 y  t
with its certi	cate Cert
c
 

 The user reencrypts the coin c into c
 
 
pk
B
 pk
u
 y  t
 The user provides an undeniable signature S using c as a public key associated with the
secret key 
sk
u
 y of the equivalence between c and c
 
 This equivalence is guaranteed by
the existence of t
 The user con	rms the validity of this signature S to the AP agent
 The AP agent certi	es the new coin c
 
and sends Cert
c
 
to the user
Indeed after steps  and  the AP is convinced of that the conversion has been performed by
the owner of the coin c c
 
is equivalent to c The owner of c will not be able deny later S 
the
relation between c and c
 

 Proof of ownership of a coin
Let us assume that Y is the public key of the bank and I  g
x
u
the identity of a user H
x y is
a hash function A coin is an encryption of I  c  
a  g
r
 b  Y
r
I
s
 which is afterwards certi	ed
by the bank where r s are random numbers With the certi	cate of the bank one knows that the
encryption is valid Therefore in order to prove his ownership the user has just to convince of his
knowledge of 
x
u
 r s such that b  Y
r
I
s
 This can be expressed in Figure 
 The prover chooses random k  Z
q
and computes t 	 Y
k
g
s x
u
se x
u
e


 He then computes u 	 k  remodq and v 	 s x
u
emodq where e 	 Hm t and m is a message
 The signature nally consists of the triple e u v
 In order to verify it one has just to compute t

	 Y
u
g
v
b
e
and check whether e 	 Hm t

 or not

Figure  Proof of validity of a coin c  Y
r
I
s
Then a scrambled coin is simply got by multiplying both parts of the old one by respective
bases g and Y  put at a same random exponent   
c
 
 
a
 
 g

a b
 
 Y

b  
g
r 
 Y
r 
I
s

Then if the owner of the old coin has certi	ed the message m
 
 h

 equivalence of both coins can
be proven with the proof of equivalence of three discrete logarithms 
log
h
m
 
 log
g

a
 
a  log
Y

b
 
b
 Anonymity selfscalable payment scheme
In this section we propose an anonymity selfscalable payment scheme The new payment scheme
has two main features one is that a user can get higher level anonymity by itself another one is
that the identity of a user can not be traced except the user spends the same coin twice
Our scheme includes two basic processes in system initialization 
bank setup and user setup
and three main protocols  a new withdrawal protocol with which U withdraws electronic coins from
B while his account is debited a new payment protocol with which U pays the coin to S and a
new deposit protocol with which S deposits the coin to B and has his account credited If a user
wants to get higher level anonymity after she got a coin from the bank 
withdrawal she can
contact to the AP agent 
 System Initialization
The bank setup and the user setup based on Discrete Logarithm Assumption are described as
follows and the details of the shop setup are omitted 
because the shop setup is similar to the user
setup
Banks setup  
performed once by B 
Primes p and q are chosen such that jp j   k for a speci	ed constant  and p  q for a
speci	ed small integer  Then a unique subgroup G
q
of prime order q of the multiplicative group
Z
p
and generator g of G
q
are de	ned Secret key x
B

R
Z
q
for a denomination is created where
a 
R
A means that the element a is selected randomly from the set A with uniform distribution
Hash function H from a family of collision intractable 
or ideally according to  correlationfree
one way hash function is also de	ned B publishes p q gH and its public keys Y  g
x
B

mod p
The secret key x
B
is safety under the DLA The Hash function will be used in payment trans
actions
Users setup account opening  
performed for each user U 
The bank B associates the user U with I  g
x
u

mod p where x
u
 G
q
is the secret key of the user
and is generated by U 
In system initialization the communication complexity is O
 for the user only sends its
account I of length l bits to the bank and the computation complexity is O
 It requires only
two exponentiations g
x
B
and g
x
u


After the users account and the shops account opening we can describe the new payment
scheme
  New oline payment scheme
We now describe the new anonymity scalable electronic cash scheme which includes withdrawal
payment and deposit
Withdrawal  As usual an anonymous coin is a certi	ed message which embeds the public key of
a user In our scheme the message is an encryption of this users public key using the public key
Y of the bank
Instead of using intricate zeroknowledge proofs to convince the bank of the validity of the
encryption the user shows some information to the bank including a signature So the bank
certi	es the encryption with full con	dence
The user I  g
x
u
constructs a coin c  
a  g
r
 b  Y
r
I
s
 using the public key Y of the bank
where s is a secret key of the coin which is kept by the user and r is a random number in Z
q
 He
also signs c together with the date using his private key x
u
and a Schnorr signature He sends both
to the bank together with r I Then the bank can check the correct encryption With the signature
of the coin and the date only the legitimate user could have done it After having modi	ed the
users account the bank sends back a certi	cate Cert
c
 The user just has to remember 
r s Cert
c

Anonymity scalability  The user can use the coin now without higher anonymity since the bank
can easily trace any transaction performed through the coin This is because some information of
the user such as I Cert
c
have been known by the bank To solve this problem an AP agent is
established to help the user making the coin anonymous  the user can derive a new encryption of his
identity in an indistinguishable way However the user will need a new certi	cate for a new issued
ciphertext The AP agent can provide this new certi	cate Before certifying the user requires both
the previous coin 
c Cert
c
 and the proof of equivalence between the two ciphertexts Details are
described as below
The user contacts to the AP agent if she needs to get higher level anonymity The user chooses
a random  and reencrypts the coin 
c
 
 
a
 
 g

a b
 
 Y

b
 The user generates a signature S  
e u v  

r xm on m  h

using the secret key

r x associated with the public one b  Y
r
I
s
as shown on Figure  Because of S the user
will not be able to deny his knowledge of  later Furthermore nobody can impersonate the
user at this step since the discrete logarithm x
u
of I is required to produce a valid signature
So there is no existential forgery
 The user also provides a designated veri	er proof of equality of discrete logarithms
log
h
m  log
g

a
 
a  log
Y

b
 
b
 The user 	nally sends c c
 
 Sm to the AP agent

 The AP agent checks the certi	cate Cert
c
on c the validity of the signature S on the message
m using the public key b He then certi	es c
 
and sends back the certi	cate Cert
c
 
to the
user
After these processes the user gets a new certi	ed coin c
 
 
a
 
 g

a b
 
 Y

b Cert
c
 
 which is
now strongly anonymous from the point of view of the bank The AP agent has to keep 
c c
 
m S
to be able to prove the link between c and c
 
 with the help of the user Users need to send I to
the AP agent
In withdrawal process the communication complexity is O
 since the user sends c I and a
signature to the bank and the bank returns Cert
c
to the user seven exponentiations are required
in withdrawal and anonymity providing process
Follow the process the AP agent can also give many smaller new coins for an old one since the
amount of new one can be embedded in the certi	cate Cert
c
 

Payment  
performed between the user and the shop over an anonymous channel
When a user possesses a coin he can simply spend it at shops  he proves his knowledge of the
secret key 
x
u
 s associated with the coin c or c
 
 This proof is a signature S  
e u v of the
purchase date etc with the secret key x s associated to the coin to the receiver 
which is later
forwarded to the bank
In payment transactions the communication complexity is O
 for the user sending c and a
signature S  
e u v to the shop There are 	ve exponentiations for the signature
Deposit 
The receiver deposits a coin to a bank
Since the system is oline the shop will send the payment transcript to the bank B later The
transcript consists of the coin c or c
 

if the user applied high level anonymity the signature and
the datetime of the transaction The bank will verify the correctness of payment and credit coin
into shops account
In deposit the communication complexity is O
 because the shop sends users response c
and signature S  
e u v to the bank The computation complexity is O
 since it only veri	es
whether c or c
 
was used before or not
Untracebility The receiver 
shop deposits the coin into its banks account with a transcript of
the payment If the user uses the same coin c twice then the user will be traced  two dierent
receivers will send the same coin c to the bank The bank can easily search its records to ensure
that c has not been used before If the user uses c twice then the bank has two dierent signatures
Thus the bank can isolate the user and trace the payment to the users account I
In our new scheme the communication complexity is O
 and fourteen exponentiations are
required So it is quite eciency
 Security Analysis
An oline Ecash scheme is secure  if the following requirements are satis	ed 
 Unreusable  If any user uses the same coin twice the identity of the users can be computed

 Unexpandable  With n withdrawal processes no ppt 
Probabilistic polynomial time Turing
Machine can compute 
n th distinct and valid coin
 Unforgeable  With any numbers of the customers withdrawal payment and deposit no ppt
Turing Machine can compute a single valid coin
 Untraceable  With any numbers of the customers valid withdrawal payment and deposit
protocols no ppt Turing Machine can compute a legal users identity
The security in our ecash scheme is based on the hardness of Discrete Logarithms  and
hash functions that preserves the above four requirements
Unreusable When a user spending a coin he hands over the coin together with a signature
S  
e u v to a shop If the user uses a coin twice then we have two signatures S

 
e

 u

 v


and S

 
e

 u

 v

 where
u

 k

 re


modq v

 s xe


modq
u

 k

 re


modq v

 s xe


modq
Then 
v

v

e

 e

 x this is the secret key of the user I So a coin in the new scheme cannot
be reused
Untraceable When a user constructs a coin she uses the secret key x and s both of them are
not shown to any other parts in the purchase process So no one can trace the user and the coin
Unforgeable As already seen the secret key x of a user is never revealed but only used in
some signatures Any user is therefore protected against any impersonation even from a collusion
of the bank the AP agent and the shop Only the user can construct a valid coin since there is
a undeniable signature embedded in the coin To prevent the bank frame the user as a multiple
spender in the scheme we use digital signature I
s
for s is known only by the user The user is
protected against frameup only computationally not unconditionally
Unexpandable For a legal user and a valid coin the secret key x and the random number s
never shown others in anytime Further more as usually the random number s will be changed
for dierent coins With n withdrawal proceedings the random number s will be changed n times
Then no one can compute 
n th distinct and valid coin even see n withdrawal proceedings
 Implementation of the Internet purchases
In this section we analyse two dierent purchase procedures We will show how to use the new
ecash for the Internet purchases and we will see the eciency of the payment protocol
Purchase procedure 
We assume the purchase procedure  is that  the user decides how much money should be paid
to the shop and withdraws the money from the bank then pays it to the shop
 User to shop  The user wants to buy some goods in a shop she contacts to the shop for the
price

 User to bank  The user gets the amount of money form the bank the amount is embedded
in the signature
 Anonymity scalability  If the user wants to get higher anonymity she can ask AP agent to
certify a new cash She can use the new cash to the shop
 User to shop  The user proves to the shop that she is the owner of the money and pays it
to the shop Then the shop sends the goods to the user
 Shop to bank  The shop deposits the ecash to the bank the bank checks the validation and
no double spending of the coin The bank increases the money into the shops account
Purchase procedure 
We assume the purchase procedure  is that  the user does not have to ask the bank sending
money since the user has enough ecash in herhis wallet All she needs to do is that she should
get some smaller ecash to pay the shop This means the user can keep ecash itself
There are also  steps in the purchase procedure  they are  user to shop user to AP agent
user to shop again and shop to bank Only user to AP agent is dierent from the procedure  and
another three steps are the same We just describe user to AP agent
User to AP agent  The user prepares the amount of money to pay the shop from hisher wallet
She can ask AP agent to make some smaller coins In the same time the user might get higher
anonymity After checking the old money the AP agent creates some new ecash which the total
is equivalent to the old ecash One of the coins is paying the shop
We have already seen that the user can keep money in its wallet or get money from the bank
And in both purchase procedures  and  most computations are done by the users It is very
convenient for the Internet purchases
	 Conclusions
In this paper a new electronic cash scheme is designed to provide dierent degrees of anonymity
for users Users could decide the anonymity levels They can have low anonymity if users want to
spend coins directly after withdrawing coins from the bank Users can get higher level anonymity
through the AP agent without showing their private information Users are more secure from the
banks point of view because the new certi	cate of a coin comes from the AP agent which does
not involve in a payment process It does not need a trusted part to manage users identities We
have shown how to derive an ecient and untraceable cash scheme based on the variants of coins
in the new model It is an oline scheme with low communication and computation With this
scalable anonymity the new payment protocol can prevent from eavesdropping tampering and
impersonation eectively Finally we have discussed how to use the new ecash over the Internet
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